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BEHIND BARS: ARE CORPORATE COUNSEL CAPTIVE TO
STATE LICENSURE?
INTRODUCTION
"[An English judge observed ... 'short of those heavy
consequences which would attach to the greater and more heinous
offences, I own I can conceive of no jurisdiction more serious than
that by which a man may be deprived of his degree and status as a
barrister. '"' In the United States, as in England, the "arduous
profession"2 of practicing law enjoys a level of esteem afforded few
other occupations. As a prerequisite to entering the hallowed field,
however, there is an obstacle: the bar exam.
3
Administration of the bar system has historically been delegated
to the fifty states and the District of Columbia.4 Because each of
these has its own unique set of procedural and substantive laws,
it follows that each necessitates a comprehensive examination
unique to that jurisdiction's intricacies. Budding attorneys, having
completed law school, often take a professional preparatory class to
master a state's law.
The system at its base seems simple: hopefuls should take the
bar exam in the state where they hope to begin their legal career.
In reality, however, the nature of state licensure is anything but
straightforward. The essence of law practice is changing rapidly.
With the growing ease of interstate travel, the expansion of large
companies, a multitude of mergers, and the explosion of technology,
1. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 147 (1961) (quoting Hudson v. Slade, 3 F. & F. 390,
411 (Q.B. 1862)).
2. Id.
3. Passage of the bar exam licenses an individual to practice only in the state in which
the exam was administered.
4. "Since the founding of the [nation), the licensing and regulation of lawyers has been
left exclusively to the states and the District of Columbia within their respective
jurisdictions." Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979); see also United Mine Workers of Am.
v. I. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967) ("That the states have broad power to
regulate the practice of law is, of course, beyond question.").
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the practice of law crosses more state borders than at any time in
United States history.
Modern practice of law differs from its traditional, largely local
foundations. The American Corporate Counsel Association, the
leader in law organizations tailored to in-house counsel, cites three
characteristics of modern practice that together signify a changing
landscape: (1) most U.S. companies do business nationwide, and
most large companies have a centralized legal department; (2)
companies need to attract and retain good counsel, regardless of
where those attorneys reside; and (3) a typical in-house attorney
has but one client: his or her employer.5 These developments have
placed the traditional licensure scheme at a critical crossroads. The
stark contrast between the idealistic foundation of state licensure
and attorneys' real-world, multijurisdictional practice necessitates
addressing whether the traditional licensure model should exist in
today's dynamic environment.
The California case of Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank,
P.C. v. Superior Courte brought this conflict to the forefront. In
Birbrower, the California Supreme Court held that a New York law
firm had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when it aided
a California client in the settlement of a contract dispute. The
court's ruling barred the law firm's recovery of more than one
million dollars in attorneys' fees.8
The Birbrower decision immediately "stirred the pot" of an
already brewing controversy over multijurisdictional practice.9 In
determining what constituted the unauthorized practice of law in
the state of California, the court found unimportant the lawyers'
physical presence in the state. Specifically, the court noted that the
5. Letter from American Corporate Counsel Association to the American Bar
Association Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice (Feb. 16, 2001) thereinafter ACCA
Letter), available at http://www.acca.com/advocacy/mjp/accaposition.cl.html (last visited Feb.
26, 2003).
6. 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998).
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 10, 13.
9. Morton Moskin, As the World Shrinks: Don't Let Globalization Leave You Behind,
BUS. L. TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2000, at 38, 44 (2000).
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defendants' failure to actually enter California was not dispositive
of whether they had practiced law in the state. 10
Critics, supporters, and legal scholars have scampered to assess
the implications of the Birbrower decision. Transactional law has
been at center stage. To date, dozens of law review articles and
journal analyses have examined Birbrower under the lens of
transactional law. ' After all, transactions in today's marketplace
are largely multijurisdictional.
As attorneys across the board face the issue of practicing law in
different geographic regions when they, for example, give advice or
engage local counsel in arbitration or litigation, in-house counsel
are in a unique position in their vigorous representation of their
one corporate client. They are compelled to meet the needs of
their employer in various regions, and their practice is often
predominantly interstate.
This Note examines what has thus far been a secondary
consideration for many scholars: the practice of in-house counsel.
With respect to multistate work, the practice is distinguishable
from that of outside counsel working in law firms or as sole
practioners. Corporate counsels' work is, by its very nature, often
10. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5. Addressing the definition of unauthorized practice of law
in California, the court noted:
The primary inquiry is whether the unlicensed lawyer engaged in sufficient
activities in the state, or created a continuing relationship with the California
client that included legal duties and obligations.
(The California Supreme Court's] definition does not necessarily depend on
or require the unlicensed lawyer's physical presence in the state. Physical
presence ... is one factor ....
Id. Advice a lawyer may render to a "California client on a California law in connection with
a California legal dispute by telephone, fax, computer, or other modern technological means"
is another factor. Id. at 5-6.
11. See, e.g., Diane Leigh Babb, Take Caution When Representing Clients Across State
Lines: The Services Provided May Constitute the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 50 ALA. L.
REV. 535, 538 (1999) (calling for "clearer definitions of permissible conduct of transactional
lawyers" after Birbrower required a fact-based assessment in making unauthorized practice
of law determinations); William T. Barker, Extra jurisdictional Practice by Lawyers, 56 BUS.
LAW. 1501, 1503 (2001) ("[Tihe most important practical problems concern transactional
practice ..... ); LaTanya James & Siyeon Lee, Adapting the Unauthorized Practice of Law
Provisions to Modern Legal Practice, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1135, 1137, 1140-41 (2001)
(asserting that the implications of Birbrower are markedly more significant for transactional
lawyers, because there is more ambiguity about the nature of their work than for their
litigation colleagues).
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multistate. This Note considers unauthorized practice of law
doctrine and suggests that in-house counsel should be answerable
to more flexible guidelines than their outside counterparts. In-
house counsel and other counsel should be accountable to different
definitions of "unauthorized practice of law," though the conse-
quences of violating those parameters should remain the same for
both groups.
Part I of this Note provides background on the unauthorized
practice of law doctrines and multistate practice. After a brief
introduction to the unauthorized practice law and its policy
justifications, this Note explores the difficulties states have
encountered in developing a common statutory definition. Of
particular concern is the regulation of multistate practice, which
at its core is diametrically opposed to the state-based system of
licensure. In cases involving the several ways in which multistate
practice occurs, courts have not been consistent in assessing
whether activities constitute the unauthorized practice of law. This
Note discusses the implications of the inconsistent employment of
standards and their applicability to in-house counsel.
Part II discusses various states' approaches to corporate counsel
activities. Some states classify the practice as unique and therefore
deserving of different evaluation; others consider the practice to be
the same as that of outside counsel and subject it to the same rules
and regulations for violation of unauthorized practice of law
provisions. The picture that develops from this analysis is blurred.
Part III relates a variety of suggestions for resolving
inconsistencies among states regarding the unauthorized practice
of law with respect to in-house counsel. The American Corporate
Counsel Association and the American Bar Association (ABA) have
each put forth solutions. Other proposals, including temporary
licensure and pro hac vice admission, may also resolve the problem.
Part III reviews each of these options and examines the feasibility
of each in turn.
Part IV concludes that the ABA Ethics Commission's proposed
changes to Model Rule 5.5 are the most practical of reasonable
alternatives. The ABA proposal includes accommodations for in-
house counsel but requires across the board enforcement for
1916 [Vol. 44:1913
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statutory violations.12 It suggests that in-house counsel should be
subject to the same disciplinary proceedings as outside counsel for
disregarding the multistate rules (to which they need comply). As
a result, although in-house counsel should have rules tailored to the
unique nature of their practice, the enforcement for violation of
those rules should parallel the enforcement of the rules for outside
counsel--discipline should be uniform.
There is a pressing need for conformity in the unauthorized
practice of law doctrine as applied to in-house counsel. States apply
different standards to similar fact patterns that by nature often
cross state borders, resulting in divergent results that cannot guide
the practice of counsel to multistate corporations.
I. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW VERSUS MULTISTATE
PRACTICE
A. Unauthorized Practice of Law
Unauthorized practice of law statutes seek to implement public
policy goals. The goal is to protect the public "against unlearned
and unskilled advice and service in matters relating to the science
of the law." 3 Unauthorized practice of law statutes may have
originated to shield the public from unscrupulous lawyers and to
control competition among corporations. 4 There is some fear that,
in the absence of prohibitions on corporations practicing law, each
business entity would perform its own services without resort to
private attorneys.
[Elxamples could be multiplied indefinitely. Ultimately most
legal work, other than the trial of cases in the courthouse, would
be performed by corporations and others not licensed to practice
law. The law practice would be hawked about as a leader or
12. ABA COMM'N ON MULTJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, REPORT 201B (Aug. 12, 2002)
[hereinafter ABAREPORT], available at httpJ/www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/201B.doc (last visited
Feb. 26, 2003).
13. Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar of Nev., 326 P.2d 408, 409 (Nev. 1958); see
also Auerbacher v. Wood, 59 A.2d 863, 864 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1948).
14. Grace M. Giesel, Corporations Practicing Law Through Lawyers: Why the
Unauthorized Practice of Law Doctrine Should Not Apply, 65 Mo. L. REV. 151, 158 (2000).
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premium to be given as an inducement for business trans-
actions. 5
According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, "[tihe reason for
prohibiting the unauthorized practice of the law by laymen [and
those attorneys not licensed under state law] is not to aid the legal
profession but to safeguard the public from the disastrous results
that are bound to flow from the activities of untrained and
incompetent individuals ...."" Further, unauthorized practice of law
doctrines protect independence of judgment. The idea is that
unlicensed lawyers, who are effectively nonlawyers in states where
they are not authorized to practice, may engage in multidisciplinary
practices affecting their legal judgment. That is, if an attorney is
providing legal services and nonlegal services to the same client,
the extent and quality of the legal services may be affected by the
profits received from the nonlegal services. This is inimical to the
core values of the legal profession; among those values is
independence of professional judgment. 17 Courts have concurred:
The public interest therefore requires that in the securing of
professional advice and assistance upon matters affecting one's
legal rights one must have assurance of competence and
integrity and must enjoy freedom of full disclosure with
complete confidence in the undivided allegiance of one's
counsellor in the definition and assertion of the rights in
question.18
15. Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 179 S.W.2d 946, 953 (Tex. 1944).
16. In re Baker, 85 A.2d 505, 511 (N.J. 1951); see also Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon
& Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1998); J.W. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.
App. 4th 95S, 969 (1993).
17. See Giesel, supra note 14, at 151, 155 (explaining that unauthorized practice of law
doctrines traditionally prevent in-house counsel from providing services to any client except
for the corporate employer out of fear that the corporate employer would exercise
"impermissible control" over the attorney). But see John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni,
Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to
Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
83, 139 (2000) (Minding the "independence of judgment" justification for the unauthorized
practice of law doctrines to be "without any significant evidentiary basis").
18. Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co., 326 P.2d at 409-10; see also Hulse v. Criger, 247
S.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Mo. 1952); Auerbacher, 59 A.2d at 863.
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The aforementioned changing landscape on the legal horizon,
however, is causing tension between these goals and state stat-
utes. 19
There is not just one statutory definition of the "practice of law,"
and neither statutory nor judicial definitions offer clear guidelines
to national players, because these definitions vary from one state to
another. For example, the Virginia Code implies that one who does
not hold a license or certificate to practice law under the laws of the
Commonwealth is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law if he
acts as counsel or attorney to another.2 ° The Alabama Code is more
specific, stating:
If any person shall, without having become duly licensed to
practice, or whose license to practice shall have expired either
by disbarment, failure to pay his license fee within 30 days after
the day it becomes due, or otherwise, practice or assume to act
or hold himself out to the public as a person qualified to practice
or carry out the calling of a lawyer, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor ....21
Given the amorphous and policy-laden justifications under-
pinning these statutes, courts have increasingly found it difficult to
apply consistent standards to unauthorized practice cases. In light
of changing realities, the California Supreme Court said in
Birbrower that it would deal with issues of unauthorized practice
of law in a commonsense fashion.22 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey employed the same reasoning in an earlier case, stating:
19. See, e.g., Estate of Condon v. McHenry, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1145-46 (1998). The
California court noted the effects of increasingly seamless boundaries upon unauthorized
practice of law doctrines:
In the real world ... we do not live or do business in isolation within strict
geopolitical boundaries. Social interaction and the conduct of business
transcends state and national boundaries; it is truly global. A tension is thus
created between the right of a party to have counsel of his or her choice and the
right of each geopolitical entity to control the activities of those who practice
within its borders.
Id.
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3900 (Michie 2001).
21. ALA. CODE § 34-3-1 (1975); see also JOHN K. VILLA, CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDELINES
§ 3.02 (1999).
22. Birbrower, Montalbuno, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior County, 949 P.2d 1, 10
(Cal. 1998).
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[Tihe determination of whether someone should be permitted to
engage in conduct that is arguably the practice of law is
governed not by attempting to apply some definition of what
constitutes that practice, but rather by asking whether the
public interest is disserved by permitting such conduct. The
resolution of the question is determined by practical, not
theoretical, considerations; the public interest is weighed by
analyzing the competing policies and interests that may be
involved in the case; the conduct, if permitted, is often con-
ditioned by requirements designed to assure that the public
interest is indeed not disserved. 2
The unauthorized practice of law doctrine has seen increasing
press over the past couple of years, particularly since Birbrower in
1998. Strangely though, there have been relatively few prosecutions
nationwide in the wake of the increased scrutiny.24 This paradox is
attributable to the novel way in which law is practiced.25 Modern
communications technology and transportation have enabled
attorneys and clients to travel easily and conduct business across
state and national boundaries. This globalization necessitates that
lawyers be able to assist clients in multiple jurisdictions to meet
their needs. There is no longer a "fairly broad range of out-of-court
activities an out-of-state lawyer can engage in without running
afoul of the prohibition."2 Because the legislators themselves have
been remiss in their duty to provide definitive standards, courts
have been tasked with doing it themselves. This Note will discuss
how courts should clarify the multistate subset of the unauthorized
practice of law.
23. In re Opinion No. 26 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 654 A.2d
1344, 1352 (N.J. 1995). The court in that case also tartly stated: "[Tihis Court does not wear
public interest blinders ...." Id.
24. See Ronald C. Minkoff, Unauthorized Practice of Law, 80 PLI/NY 265, 268 (2000).
25. See id.
26. Sylvia Stevens,A Cautionary Note: The Wagons May be Circling, 58 OR. ST. B. BULL.
29, 29 (1998).
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B. Multistate Practice
Under the state licensure model in the United States legal
system, multistate practice takes place when an attorney licensed
in one state carries his business from his "home" state, the state in
which he is licensed, into a "foreign" state, one in which he has not
passed the bar examination, and performs legal services therein.
This seemingly simple definition unfortunately, does not play out
very easily in actual cases.27
In the particular circumstances presented by the facts of each
case, courts have held that out-of-state counsel who performed legal
services for a single client in a single matter had or had not engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law; those who advised clients via
the Internet and other technological means had or had not violated
unauthorized practice of law doctrines; attorneys who maintained
an office in the foreign state had or had not performed an un-
authorized practice of law; and out-of-state counsel residing in the
foreign state of licensure had or had not violated the provisions
disallowing multistate practice under the unauthorized practice of
law. The following discussion further examines each of these
scenarios in which the practice of law has changed, illustrating the
unpredictability in the application of unauthorized practice of law
doctrines.
1. Single Client, Single Matter
Although lawyers often face repetitive or continuous issues in
representation of their clients' interests, many occasions arise in
which attorneys are called on to solve one problem or to give advice
on a single issue. For example, estate planning and criminal
defense often deal with one client and one "need." Even in these
clear-cut cases in which the issue has well-defined parameters,
27. Recall that unauthorized practice of law doctrines apply to: (1) persons not licensed
to practice law but doing so under the guise of competence as an attorney and (2) attorneys
practicing law in a state different from that in which they are licensed. Multistate practice
encompasses the latter subset.
2003] 1921
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courts have rendered disparate opinions as to what constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law.2"
2. Technological Interaction
In the new and relatively uncharted area of practice via the
Internet, jurisprudence is also mixed. "Attorney communications
via the Internet carry risks that are not immediately obvious."29 In
28. Compare Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d
1 (Cal. 1998) (holding it illegal for a New York law firm to have represented a California
corporation during execution of an arbitration agreement wherein counsel traveled to
California to meet with client and negotiate on its behalf), Butler v. State, 668 N.E.2d 266
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (opining that an attorney engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
by representing an Indiana criminal defendant in an Illinois court without pro hac vice
admission), Spivak v. Sachs, 211 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 1965) (finding a California attorney in
violation of New York's unauthorized practice of law doctrine for coming to New York to
advise a resident about her marital problems), and Norton v. Hughes, 5 P.3d 588 (Okla.
2000) (holding that Oklahoma attorneys were not permitted to file a lawsuit mi a foreign
jurisdiction on behalf of a client once the same matter was dismissed in Oklahoma for lack
of personal jurisdiction), with Estate of Condon v. McHenry, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1138 (1998)
(determining that a Colorado law fi-m did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law in
California by physically and virtually entering California on behalf ofa Colorado client, who,
together with his sister, a California resident, were co-executors on a will that had been
prepared in Colorado by the Colorado firm), Fought & Co. v. Steel Eng'g & Erection, Inc., 951
P.2d 487 (Haw. 1998) (finding for a company's out-of-state general counsel's consultation with
its in-state trial attorneys was not authorized practice of law), In re Waring's Estate, 221
A.2d 193 (N.J. 1966) (asserting that a New York law firm was authorized in its
representation of estate matters for a New Jersey family with which the firm had a
longstanding relationship and for whom the New York firm had, in many instances, provided
representation), and Appell v. Reiner, 204 A.2d 146 (N.J. 1964) (holding that a New York
attorney did not violate unauthorized practice of law provisions when he represented a New
Jersey couple regarding financial matters relevant to both New York and New Jersey
creditors).
29. Michael Gemignani, The Practice of Law On the Internet: Ethical Concerns, 64 TEX.
B.J. 632, 634 (2001). Gemignani proffers the following hypothetical to demonstrate the ease
with which the practice of law via the Internet could arise daily:
Attorney Jones has a website approved by the State Bar .... Jones' website
includes a form that allows visitors to submit legal questions to Jones, who will
respond with a free opinion. When providing the free opinion, Jones sends a
telephone number the inquirer can call if he or she wishes to schedule an
appointment with him to follow up on the matter. Once a week, Jones also hosts
a chat room which anyone can visit to pose legal questions.... In addition, Jones,
a specialist in computer law, has a listserv (email mailing list) on which he
provides commentaries to subscribers on the latest developments in computer
law.
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Birbrower, the court held that, to the extent services for the
California client were rendered in New York, the severability
doctrine"0 allowed for the recovery of attorneys' fees for the practice
of law outside of California. Law practiced using technological
means without physical presence in California-for example, e-mail
correspondence, facsimile transmissions, and long-distance tele-
phone conversations with the California client-was not practiced
in-state and therefore did not violate California law.3' Without
principled guidelines3 2 with which courts may make distinctions
in the relatively uncharted area of technological law practices,
inconsistent holdings are inevitable.
3. Out-of-State Counsel with Office In-State
Often an attorney licensed in one state holds offices in another
state from which he engages in the practice of law. In these cases,
courts have made disparate findings as to whether given fact
patterns constituted or did not constitute the unauthorized practice
of law. 3 For example, in Ranta v. McCarney, the Supreme Court of
30. The severability doctrine allows for recovery of fees generated under a fee agreement
that may have in part been illegal and in part legal.
[Clourts may sever the illegal portion of the contract from the rest of the
agreement.... When the transaction is of such a nature that the good part of the
consideration can be separated from that which is bad, the Courts will make the
distinction, for the ... law ... (divides] according to common reason; and having
made that void that is against law, lets the rest stand ....
Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 11-12 (quoting Keene v. Harling, 392 P.2d 273, 275 (Cal. 1964)).
31. Id. at 6, 13. In this respect, application of the Birbrower holding becomes enigmatic.
It is not as easy as the court suggests to conclude whether electronic transactions take place
at the site of transmission or reception.
32. Although the Birbrower holding makes it apparentthat technological interaction with
clients may constitute entering a state and thus trigger unauthorized practice of law
violations, there are no bright-line principles by which a determination of "when enough is
enough" can be made. See id.
33. Compare Servidone Constr. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 911 F. Supp. 560
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying New York law and finding an out-of-state attorney had engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law by establishing an office in New York and representing
a New York corporation in federal court in a matter involving federal law), In re Peterson,
163 B.R. 665 (Bkrtcy. D. Conn. 1994) (holding that an attorney violated the Connecticut
unauthorized practice of law statute for maintaining an office in Connecticut from which he
represented clients on federal bankruptcy issues), Perlah v. S.E.I. Corp., 612 A.2d 806
(Bkrtcy. D. Conn. 1992) (finding unauthorized practice of law where a New York attorney,
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North Dakota found that "[aln out-of-state lawyer who is not
authorized to practice law in [North Dakota, such as one holding an
officer therein to serve clientsI sits in the same position as a
suspended attorney .. such a person cannot lawfully practice law
in [North Dakota] ...."3 In contrast, the Court of Appeals of
Michigan, in Shapiro v. Steinberg, found that collecting information
as counsel in preparation for a trial, though serving in an office in
which he was not licensed, was a service that "[did] not constitute
the unauthorized practice of law."3 5 As with the single client, single
matter, and Internet practice examples, the varying approaches
courts have taken have done little to bring clarity to this area of the
law.
4. Out-of-State Counsel Resides in State
Occasionally counsel resides in a state in which he is not licensed.
As with the preceding three scenarios, courts have not been
consistent in their application of the unauthorized practice of law
working from a Connecticut office, prepared documentation for a Connecticut corporation to
acquire the controlling interest in a New York corporation), Ranta v. McCarney, 391 N.W.2d
161 (N.D. 1986) (deciding an attorney licensed in Minnesota had violated the North Dakota
unauthorized practice of law provisions by providing tax advice to a North Dakota resident
from a branch office in Bismarck), and Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Misch, 695 N.E.2d 244 (Ohio
1998) (holding that an attorney not licensed to practice law in Ohio, but who had provided
legal services relating to the financial matters of clients of an Ohio firm with whom he had
a contractual relationship, had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law), with Sobol v.
Perez, 298 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La. 1968) (applying Louisiana law and finding it allowable for
an out-of-state attorney to represent a criminal defendant after being in the state
temporarily and associating with local counsel), Ex parte McCue, 293 P. 47 (Cal. 1930)
(holding a Montana attorney did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law for
participating in state court cases while maintaining an office in California from which to
practice in federal court), and Shapiro v. Steinberg, 440 N.W.2d 9 (Mich. 1989) (holding it
was not unauthorized practice of law for a Massachusetts attorney operating in a Michigan
office to do preparatory work for a possible wrongful death claim on behalf of a deceased
friend's family against an airline). In McCue, however, the same court found that the
preparation of depositions did constitute the unauthorized practice of law in California
because he was not yet admitted there. See McCue, 293 P. at 68.
34. Ranta, 391 N.W.2d at 164.
35. Shapiro, 440 N.W.2d at 12.
1924
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doctrine.36 In the case of In re Jackman," a Massachusetts attorney
was found to have violated the unauthorized practice of law
doctrine by serving eight years as an associate at a New Jersey law
firm.3 The attorney petitioner pointed to the ongoing national
debate concerning licensure issues implicated by modern multi-
jurisdictional practice that this Note describes.39 The Supreme
Court of New Jersey rejected that argument finding:
That ongoing national discussion has nothing to do with this
case. We have not amended our rules. Our practice
requirements are straightforward and may not be ignored.
Unless and until we amend our rules governing admission to
practice, the existing rules must be followed. The California
Supreme Court expected no less in Birbrower .... We regard with
concern Jackman's assertion that there are numerous others in
circumstances like his .... Accordingly, we refer that assertion to
the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law for review
and appropriate recommendation.4
C. Implications
The implications of the variation in case law are markedly
problematic. Courts have failed to provide a working definition or
36. Compare Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995) (holding that a
Massachusetts attorney residing in Florida had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
for entering into a contingent fee agreement with an accident victim in Florida), Lozoff v.
Shore Heights, Ltd., 362 N.E.2d 1047 (Ill. 1977) (finding that participating in negotiation of
real estate transaction was the unauthorized practice of law by a Wisconsin attorney for
services performed in Illinois), and In re Jackman, 761 A.2d 1103 (N.J. 2000) (penalizing a
Massachusetts attorney for engaging in the unauthorized practice oflaw in New Jersey while
awaiting admission thereto), with Dietrich Corp. v. King Res. Co., 596 F.2d 422 (10th Cir.
1979) (applying Colorado law and finding that a professor of law, licensed to practice in
Illinois, was permitted under the statute to act as consultant to attorneys of record in a
Colorado lawsuit), Disciplinary Council v. Brown, 584 N.E.2d 1391 (Ohio Bd. Comm'rs on
Unauthorized Practice of Law 1992) (finding that distributing a resume reflecting Ohio
licensure was not the unauthorized practice oflaw, though serving as an Ohio arbitrator was
for a New York attorney whose application to the Ohio bar was pending), with In re Waters,
447 P.2d 661 (Nev. 1968) (holding it allowable for a Texas attorney to correspond with
California inmates on letterhead with a Nevada return address while a bar application was
pending in Nevada).
37. 761 A.2d 1103 (N.J. 2000).
38. Id. at 1103.
39. See id. at 1109.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
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framework for analysis that clearly can guide in-house counsel in
their adherence to licensure laws in daily practice."'
II. SHOULD THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW DOCTRINE EVEN
APPLY TO IN-HOUSE COUNSEL?
In-house counsel are unique in many aspects of their practice:
they have duties to only one client and their employers often
require interstate practice to service each of the company's
locations. For these reasons some scholars have suggested that the
unauthorized practice of law doctrine should not apply to in-house
counsel. One attorney aptly noted that "[t]he rules of this game are
convoluted.""2
By consistently validating a rule that disables multijursidictional
practice, states are ignoring the metamorphosis of the practice of
law."3 Modern practice is not the same as it was at the turn of the
century when the corporate practice of law was an emerging area
of legal scholarship:
The corporate practice of law doctrine might be valid if
everything in the practice of law were the same as it was in
1910. The role and position of attorney-employees is not the
41. Birbrower offered a "sufficient contacts" test:
In our view, the practice of law "in California" entails sufficient contact with the
California client to render the nature of the legal service a clear legal
representation. In addition to a quantitative analysis, we must consider the
nature of the unlicensed lawyer's activities in the state. Mere fortuitous or
attenuated contact will not sustain a finding that the unlicensed lawyer
practiced law "in California." The primary inquiry is whether the unlicensed
lawyer engaged in sufficient activities in the state, or created a continuing
relationship with the California client that included legal duties and
obligations.
Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5. The court went on to clarify its understanding of sufficient contacts
by saying, "Conversely, although we decline to provide a comprehensive list of what activities
constitute sufficient contact with the state, we do reject the notion that a person
automatically practices law 'in California' whenever that person practices California law
anywhere, or virtually' enters the state by telephone, fax, e-mail, or satellite." Id. at 6. This
test is both amorphous and unworkable. In failing to provide a clear explanation of its
sufficient contacts test, the California Supreme Court muddled other courts' understandings
of the holding and its applicability to similar unauthorized practice of law challenges.
42. Gerard E. Wimberly, Jr., The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Licensed Attorneys:
A Perilous Paradox, 37 ARIZ. ATr'Y 29 (2001).
43. See id.
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same. A large percentage of the practicing bar now practices in-
house. Not only have the numbers of attorney-employees
increased but in-house attorneys also have gained prestige in
the last twenty years. Corporations now hire attorneys to do
very sophisticated legal work. Attorneys with much power,
experience, and prestige commonly move in-house.4 4
The cultural shift has rendered traditional unauthorized practice
of law doctrines outmoded"5 and obsolete.'" Yet courts have failed
to rally with the times.' 7 There is an ongoing debate about whether
the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility ought to be
revised' to rescind some of these restrictions.' Moreover, recent
calls to eliminate restrictions on the corporate practice of law in
favor of a more commonsense approach have swelled.50 Abolition of
44. Giesel, supra note 14, at 180-81; see also Moskin, supra note 9, at 38 (referring to a
anew system ... animated by... dynamism"); Stevens, supra note 26, at 29 (citing Birbrower
as failing to bring regulation of lawyers into consonance with modern legal practice); ACCA
Letter, supra note 5 (introducing substantive evidence of a changing practice of law).
45. Giesel, supra note 14, at 205. In 1928, when the ABA put forth its Canons of Ethics,
Canon 35 provided:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by
any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should
avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the
interest of such intermediary.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 35 (1969). These Canons were adopted by the
ABA to serve as a general guide for the profession. When adopted, the rationale was that the
administration ofjustice could only be "pure and unsullied" if members of the legal profession
maintained a certain level of conduct and character. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS
pmbl. (1908). To that end, the Canons were to serve as guiding principles in that endeavor.
See id. These Canons were reflective of both "bench and bar." Giesel, supra note 14, at 205
(citing Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the
Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 585 (1989)).
46. See Giesel, supra note 14, at 180-82.
47. See, e.g., Third Nat'l Bank v. Celebrate Yourself Prods., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 704, 706
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) ("It is well established that a corporation cannot practice law, nor can
it employ a licensed practitioner to practice for it.").
48. Giesel, supra note 14, at 206 (referring the proposed revisions to the Model Rules that
seek to eliminate restrictions on the type of entity in which an attorney may practice as well
as barriers to lawyers joining with nonlawyers in a multidisciplinary fashion).
49. See infra Part IV for in-depth analysis of proposed amendments to the Model Rules.
50. Giesel, supra note 14, at 207. H.H. Walker Lewis long ago wrote: "If, however, there
is a real evil in the practice of law by corporations it should be met on real grounds. Only
mythological demons can long be exorcised with hocus pocus." H.H. Walker Lewis, Corporate
Capacity to Practice Law-A Study in Legal Hocus Pocus, 2MD. L. REV. 342,354 (1938). "The
Model Rules protect more directly against the evils feared if corporations can practice law
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unauthorized practice of law doctrines for in-house counsel is but
one possible solution to the growing problem. States have tried,
unsuccessfully, to address the issue.
III. STATES' APPROACHES
States have been as divided as the scholars and courts in their
approach to dealing with this "in-house counsel problem." This
variety of approaches offers no clear guidance for corporate
counsel."1 Of the fifty-one jurisdictions nationwide, merely fourteen
have corporate counsel rules recognizing the unique needs of in-
house attorneys. 2 In Michigan, the Board of Law Examiners Rule
5 provides in part: "An attorney ... practicing law in an institutional
setting, e.g., counsel to a corporation or instructor in a law school,
may apply to the Board for a special certificate of qualification to
practice law."53 Michigan thus recognizes special exemptions for
corporate counsel.5' Ohio provides even more specific language to
exempt corporate attorneys not licensed in the state to nonetheless
practice therein:
An attorney who is admitted to the practice of law in another
state, but not in Ohio, and who is employed full-time by a
nongovernmental Ohio employer may register for corporate
status by filing a Certificate of Registration .... An attorney who
is granted corporate status may perform legal services in Ohio
via attorneys." Giesel, supra note 14, at 205.
51. For a thorough look at what different states have done with their statutory provisions
in this area, see ATTORNEYS' LIABILrrY ASSURANCE SOCIETY, INC., STATUTES AND RULES
LIMITING MULTIJURISDICTIONAL LAW PRACTICE FRoM51 UNITED STATES JURISDICTIONS (2000)
(compiled for the American Bar Association Symposium on Multijurisdictional Practice of
Law), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-uplrules.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
52. The fourteen are Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington. Corporate
Counsel, at http:/www.crossingthebar.com/corporate-counsel.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2003)
[hereinafter Corporate Counsel].
53. MICHIGANSTATEBAR, RULES FORTHE BOARDOFLAW EXAMINERS (2000), available at
http/www.michbar.org/admission/ble.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
54. These exemptions usually take the form of temporary licensure. Attorneys are given
authorization to practice law for a certain period of time, three months for example, if they
are already licensed elsewhere. After the period of temporary authorization passes, the
attorney may not practice law without gaining full licensure in the foreign state. This model
basically allows for a grace period once an attorney begins work in a foreign state.
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solely for a nongovernmental Ohio employer, as long as the
attorney is a full-time employee of that employer."
The Washington State Court Rules56 are much the same as Ohio's.57
Fourteen jurisdictions have employed similar provisions.58
Eight additional jurisdictions, though they have not drafted
distinct rules for in-house counsel, have created exceptions within
their rules providing that corporate attorneys may practice in a
foreign state in which they are not licensed.59 Washington, D.C.'s
Unauthorized Practice Rule 49(c)(6), for example, contains an
exception from the prohibition against practicing law in the District
of Columbia for "Internal Counsel.' ° Seven states have analogous
provisions.
Remarkably, the remaining jurisdictions have neither drafted
rules calling for special application to in-house counsel nor created
exceptions wherein some leniency is given to this incomparable
class.6'
The inconsistency in states' approaches, coupled with the immi-
nence of the issue, spurred several recommendations in anticipation
of an ABA proposal in 2002. Part IV will discuss these alternatives
55. OHIO RULES OF COURT, SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE BAR OF OHIO, available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Rules/govbar/ (last visited Feb.
26, 2003).
56. See WASHINGTON STATE COURT RULES, WASHINGTON COURTS, RULES OF GENERAL
APPLICATION: ADMISSION TO PRACTICE, available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/rules/ (last
visited Feb. 26, 2003).
57. Washington State Court R. 8(t) reads:
A lawyer admitted to the practice of law in a state or territory of the United
States or the District of Columbia may apply to the Board of Governors for a
limited license to practice law as in-house counsel in this state when the lawyer
is employed in Washington as a lawyer exclusively for a profit or not for profit
corporation, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, association, or other
business entity, that is not a government entity, and whose lawful business
consists of activities other than the practice of law or the provision of legal
services.
Id.
58. To access the information about these jurisdictions' rules listed in note 42, as well as
those who have crafted exceptions, see Corporate Counsel, supra note 52.
59. Id. These jurisdictions are Alabama, Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington, D.C. Id.
60. D.C. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITrEE ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW, R. 49,
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW, available at http'/www.dcbar.orglfor-lawyers/courts/
court_of_appeals/rule49.cfm (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
61. See Corporate Counsel, supra note 52.
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and their feasibility and adequacy with regard to their goal of
presenting a principled, consistent approach to apply in future
practice scenarios.
IV. ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
Various interested groups of legal professionals have put forth
their ideas for addressing in-house counsel's unique and growing
needs with respect to state licensure. The ABA created the
Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, which presented its
final report in August 2002. In addition to sometimes endorsing
those practices already adopted by the states, several interest
groups and scholars have put forth new suggestions to create
uniformity in adapting the unauthorized practice of law provisions
to in-house counsel. Although this is inherently difficult, given the
inconsistent nature of the statutes6 2 and states' definitions of the
unauthorized practice of law,"3 the nature of interstate practice and
commonplace practice of companies' hiring in-house attorneys
demands a prompt and uniform recommendation.6' The following
discussion explains several proposed alternatives.
A. American Corporate Counsel Association Proposal
The American Corporate Counsel Association (ACCA) is the
predominant professional organization to which in-house counsel
belong. Its triumvirate proposal65 entails the following.
62. See discussion supra Part I.
63. See discussion supra Part II.
64. See CharlesW. Wolfram, SneakingAround in the LegalProfession: Interjuriadictional
Unauthorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 665, 668-69 (1995). For
a brief summary of these changes, see C. Evan Stewart, Corporate Counsel and the
Unauthorized Practice of Law: "Special is Not Necessarily Better, N.Y. L.J. (2001).
65. The entire proposal can be found on ACCA's website. AMERICAN CORPORATE COUNSEL
ASSOCIATION, THE IN-HOUSE CASE FOR THE MULTUTURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES, at http://www.acca.com/advocacy/mjp/accaposition.html (last visited Feb. 26,
2003).
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1. "Home State Admission""
The ACCA proposal would permit a lawyer to relocate to a second
state without having to take the bar exam in the new state. The
proposal would require that the attorney be in good standing in his
home state (state of origin) and register in his new state within a
certain number of days. The new state would have regulatory
authority over the attorney and could further set requirements, the
meeting of which would entitle the attorney to be eligible for full
admission to the new state's bar. An attorney would take one bar
exam, in his home state, and would receive "permission" to practice
in other states, if that practice is occasional, not regular.6 7 For
example, if an attorney moves from his home state of licensure,
State A, to State B, and establishes a residence therein, this
provision allows State B to admit the attorney to practice in State
B if the attorney was in good standing in State A, registered in
State B within a defined period, and passed State B's requirements
for character of fitness. Unlike the current model in place, the
attorney would not have to take State B's bar exam, and, upon
being admitting to practice in State B, would be subject to discipline
in State B as if licensed under the traditional method.
2. "Occasional/ Temporary Presence"--The "Drivers' License'
Model"68
Pursuant to the second part of the ACCA proposal, all U.S. states
would infer a license for attorneys whose practice occasionally or
temporarily takes them to a foreign (non-home state) jurisdiction to
practice.6 9 Unlike home state admission, this proposal applies to
attorneys not seeking to relocate their practice but rather those
whose practice sometimes crosses over to the foreign state. This is
referred to as the "drivers' license model" because, as with a drivers'
license, the traveling is often temporary, yet the party is subject to
local rules, regulations, and discipline for any infractions occurring
in those states.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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This prong requires no formalities like the first prong; the foreign
state does not need to admit the attorney to practice therein. There
is no fee, exam, or registration required. 70 The host state in which
the attorney is practicing could assert disciplinary jurisdiction, as
with a car accident, and may defer to the attorney's home state or
jointly prosecute the attorney with the home state's enforcement
personnel."'
3. "The States' Compact to Enact This System"72
Pursuant to this prong of the ACCA proposal, states would
collectively create a "model" compact, and then each jurisdiction
would "endorse the compact locally as the vehicle for regulating
licensure within their jurisdiction. " 73 This "model compact" would
apply only to those attorneys already licensed to practice in at least
one state; for non-licensed individuals, the states' traditional
unauthorized practice of law doctrines would remain intact. This
model would not require states to adopt a standard code, but it
would require that they give recognition to the original admission
standards of other jurisdictions (a database may facilitate this
prong-one that would keep track of those counsel admitted
nationwide as well as their bar standing). In the alternative, ACCA
calls for the application of the first two prongs of the proposal to
only in-house counsel, who would not be required to take a second
bar examination upon relocation.74
The ACCA proposal, admittedly in need of development, is also
far too broad and abstract to receive widespread approval. Lawyers
may have a tendency to take the bar in the "easiest" state and
waive into a second state where they are actually practicing.
Pursuant to the first prong of the proposal, an attorney licensed in
State A could occasionally practice in .State B without jumping
through too many proverbial hoops. For that reason, an attorney
may choose to make his State A the state which has a notably
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (referring to a "common framework [developed by the states] that would create
coordinated reciprocity").
74. Id.
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higher bar passage rate, yet practice in State B with some
consistency. Pursuant to the third prong, this becomes more
problematic, because an attorney licensed in State A presumably
could practice permanently in State B if both states adopted the
compact, requiring State B to give deference to the attorney's
admission to the bar of State A. Although the proposal addresses
enforcement concerns by mentioning jurisdiction, there remain
considerations as to in-house counsel being subjected to more than
one jurisdiction. The proposal as written allows the host state, State
B in the above example, to assert jurisdiction over the attorney, to
refer jurisdiction to State A, or to jointly prosecute the lawyer in
conjunction with State A's enforcement personnel." In theory, then,
in-house counsel who become admitted under the third prong of the
ACCA proposal could be subject to discipline by both State A and
State B simultaneously, as State B determines. Enforcement
becomes a principal problem when applied to the real-world
likelihood of an attorney subject to two states' laws. In addition,
although limiting the suggestions to in-house counsel would address
their arguably unique positioning, it would create a disparity within
the law community as to "real" counsel and "in-house" counsel.76
There may be downsides to singling out in-house counsel. First,
counsel may be treated as they are in the European Community,
i.e., as less independent and perhaps not as professionally worthy
of the privileges and responsibilities of the legal profession."
Second, when in-house counsel are subject to plaintiffs' depositions,
as they often serve as the point contact in corporate investigations,
allowing disclosure of confidential, attorney-client information could
prove problematic in in-house counsel's accountability and trust-
worthiness as recipients of information.78
75. Id.
76. See generally Stewart, supra note 64 (asserting that treating in-house counsel as
special" is problematic because it creates a snubbing, or turned-nose effect by outside
counsel when examining in-house attorneys).
77. See, e.g., Case 155/79, Australian Mining & Smelting Europe Ltd. v. Commission,
1982 E.C.R. 1575 (requiring client to provide investigating agency documents which
contained communications with legal counsel); see also J. Case, Are Your Internal
Communications Protected?, ACCA DOCKET 32, 36-37 (NovlDec. 1996).
78. See Stewart, supra note 64.
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B. ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Proposal
The ABA Ethics Commission presented its final report in August,
2002.79 Included in that report were several proposed changes to
Model Rule 5.5.0o Section (d) has been amended to read: "A lawyer
admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred
or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal
services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that ... are
provided to the lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates
and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice
admission .... ,s' These rules are referred to as "safe harbor"8 2
provisions-excepting in-house counsel from traditional state un-
authorized practice of law rules.
This revision to the Model Rules would permit in-house counsel
to work for their employer-clients in transactions on the employers'
behalf, in jurisdictions outside the attorney's home state of
licensure, provided that the work does not involve judicial or agency
proceedings that would otherwise require pro hac vice admission.
For example, an in-house attorney working for ACME Corporation
could serve ACME at all of its offices and in all of its matters in the
United States so long as that service did not vitiate the pro hac vice
doctrines.
This proposal may seem similar to the third prong of the ACCA
proposal, but such an analogy is inaccurate. Like the ACCA
proposal, the ABA recommendations clearly make exceptions for
certain types of law practice, but the ABA proposal does not in-
herently distinguish 3 a class of attorneys from their colleagues in
terms of the practice of law. Moreover, this does not vitiate the
policies behind unauthorized practice of law doctrines-protecting
the public from incompetent attorneys. "From a regulatory per-
spective, a lawyer who is employed to represent an organization on
79. ABA REPORT, supra note 12.
80. Id. These changes are similar to what many of the eastern states have done. See
discussion supra Part Ill.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. For discussion of the problems with singling out classes of attorneys, see supra notes
76-78 and accompanying text.
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an ongoing basis poses less of a risk to the client and the public
than a lawyer retained by an individual on a one-time basis."
84
C. Pro Hac Vice Extended
Pro hac vice admission allows an attorney to practice in a foreign
state before a tribunal for one purpose and one matter only.85
Beyond that, attorneys need to seek licensure in the foreign state.
As applied to in-house counsel, an analogous provision could make
single matter representation allowable upon a special request for
certification.
Pro hac vice admission is an established tradition with "almost
no reported problems""6 that applies across the board to all counsel.
It is the status quo response to the problem of multijurisdictional
practice. It may be sufficient for transactional attorneys but not for
in-house counsel whose work is often repetitive and continuous.
That is, special dispensation for allowable work on one matter fails
to address the steady-stream nature of corporate counsel's work.
Moreover, it is becoming particularly problematic in today's
complex legal environment in which isolated legal situations are
seldom the norm with corporate clients-their problems may span
several issues or matters.
D. Temporary Licensure with Full Licensure Beyond Threshold
No one has suggested this fourth proposal as a national solution.
Many central states have called for temporary licensure and, if the
attorney's work exceeds some threshold, require application for
full licensure s7 Minnesota, for example, allows in-house counsel to
84. ABA Report, supra note 12. Contra Pamela A. McManus, Have Law License; Will
Travel, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 527, 543 (2002) ("States would not willingly grant
permission to incompetent lawyers to practice within the state, so states necessarily presume
the competence of all corporate counsel.").
85. For example, an attorney may work on one transaction or arbitration but not more
without running afoul ofthepro hoc vice admission. William T. Barker, IADC Submits Model
Pro Hac Vice Rule to ABA Multiurisdictional Practice Commission, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 148,
149, 151-53 (2001).
86. Id. at 151.
87. The proposal is less aggressive than the alternatives by merely requiring an overlay
to the current system. For a more in-depth explanation of temporary licensure, see discussion
supra Part II.
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apply for a twelve-month, temporary license to practice in the
state.8" Missouri similarly provides for a five-year limited admission
to qualifying corporate counsel.8 9 As with the first prong of the
ACCA proposal, application for full licensure may include estab-
lishing residence, showing evidence of good standing in the previous
state of licensure, and passing the new state's requirements for
character of fitness. Contrary to tradition, the attorney would not
have to take the new state's bar exam if these other formalities
are met. Because this licensure would become permanent upon
completing the requirements, the attorney would now be subject to
the new state's jurisdiction and enforcement mechanisms.
This proposal could well discourage corporations from hiring in-
house counsel at the expense (both in time and money) of requiring
in-house counsel to obtain multiple certifications and, in doing so,
subjecting those attorneys to sanction in multiple jurisdictions in
the event of wrongdoing. Moreover, it may spur a trend towards
multistate or mega-firm monopoly in the legal arena and resulting
disadvantage in smaller firms' ability to compete.
V. RECOMMENDATION
The ABA Ethics Commission's proposed changes to the Model
Rules are the most workable and the least combative solution.90
First, as has been shown in many of the eastern states, this
proposal is feasible. It allows attorneys to cross state lines in
working for their one client, the corporation, and in working on
general, nonlitigation issues. On this type of work, the attorney
operates within "safe harbor" from unauthorized practice of law
statutes. For work before a tribunal, the attorney must still receive
licensure or pro hac vice admission in the foreign state.
This is not combative in large part because it is clear by the very
nature of the businesses for which they work that these lawyers
must serve in more than one locale. Moreover, corporate counsel
have already been serving the needs of their employers across state
boundaries. Nationwide adoption of the ABA's proposal would
88. Minnesota Corporate Counsel Rule, at http://www.crossingthebar.com/MN-CC.htm
(last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
89. Id.
90. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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validate this already entrenched practice. The enforcement of these
revisions should be the same as for outside counsel. That is,
typically attorneys are subject to punishment, up to and including
disbarment, for the unauthorized practice of law. In-house counsel
should be subject to the same provisions upon violating the revised
Model Rules. Violation of the Model Rules would include the
practice of law outside of the safe harbor. Therefore, if an attorney
appears before a tribunal, his violation will be sanctioned with the
same severity as would the violation of any lawyer practicing law
in a foreign state for any outside client.
CONCLUSION
The state licensure model is steeped in tradition and history and
it is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The nature of
state licensure and federalism concerns render much change in this
area improbable, or at least slow. States have long enjoyed the
privilege of defining the requirements to practice law within their
boundaries. They are unlikely to relinquish this privilege easily in
the interest of a uniform standard for practicing law.
Nevertheless, the nature of law practice is changing. With the
increase in interstate travel and the advent of facsimile, e-mail, and
Internet transmissions, attorneys are practicing law and delivering
legal advice in new and cross-boundary ways. As many industries
have globalized during the past several years, and corporations that
"hold court" in several locales are prevalent, corporate counsel
needs to cross boundaries as never before. Finally, employers fre-
quently hire inside legal help to handle corporate issues and likely
assume that in-house counsel are competent to handle their needs
corporate-wide. For these reasons, though unauthorized practice of
law statutes are well-founded, there is a need to accommodate the
different ways in which law is practiced today.
States have largely disparate rules and variously interpret the
unauthorized practice of law doctrine. There is a need for uniform-
ity, both because of the state discrepancies and because of the
modern trend towards multistate practice and blurred state and
practice boundaries.
The ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice gave little
more than a passing mention to in-house counsel in its final report.
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In-house counsel have unique duties to their clients, and a new
approach to state licensure, in certain instances exclusing work
before tribunals and for this one class of attorneys, may be in order.
Just as pro hac vice admission allows attorneys to practice before
tribunals in foreign states, a parallel exception should allow in-
house counsel to perform extended practice for their employers in
foreign jurisdictions, even when not appearing before tribunals.
This most workable and helpful approach is embodied the ABA
Ethics Commission's proposed amendment to Model Rule 5.5.
One thing is certain: counsel would be better guided by uniform-
ity. Standards and application today are too scattered to render any
clear picture of what the law is. Multistate practice can only be
adapted to meet the growing, changing needs of counsel if there is
a clear picture of the law. Violations of the doctrine are increasingly
common, and the rising trend in interstate practice for in-house
counsel is likely to continue with or without a change in the law.
The time has come to recognize that the practice of law has not
been, is not, and will not be the same; the rules should not be
either.
Elizabeth A. Wickerham*
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